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THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCE 
DAVID ELKINS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Because domestic corporations are subject to tax on their worldwide income 
while foreign corporations are subject to tax only on their U.S.-source income,1 
corporate residence is one of the more important issues in the field of 
international taxation.2 Under current U.S. law, and subject to a single exception 
designed to inhibit the expatriation of domestic corporations via inversion,3 a 
corporation’s residence is a function of its place of incorporation (“POI”): a 
corporation created or organized under the law of any U.S. state is domestic, 
while a corporation created or organized under the law of any other jurisdiction 
is foreign.4 Other countries tend to look to the place where the corporation is 
controlled or managed—common terms of usage include “central management 
and control” (“CMC”) and “place of effective management”—to determine 
corporate residence.5 Some commentators have suggested that the United States 
 
* Professor of Law, Netanya School of Law, Israel. Ph.D., University of Bar-Ilan 1999; LL.M., 
University of Bar-Ilan 1992; LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1982. 
 1. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (2012). 
 2. Although liability to tax on foreign-source income is the most important consequence of 
corporate residence, there are other consequences as well. Foreign corporations, but not domestic 
corporations, are exempt from U.S. tax on U.S.-source portfolio interest. I.R.C. § 881(c)(1) (2012). 
Capital gain from the sale of personal property by a domestic corporation is subject to U.S. income 
tax, while capital gain from the sale of personal property by a foreign corporation is not. I.R.C. § 
865(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Foreign corporations might be entitled to benefit from the terms of an income 
tax treaty that reduces or eliminates their U.S. tax liability for U.S.-source income. Furthermore, 
the U.S. tax liability of a person who receives dividends or interest from a corporation could turn 
on whether the corporation paying the income is domestic or foreign. I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)–(2), 
862(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 3. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(1) (2012). 
 4. I.R.C. § 7701(4)–(5) (2012). For the purpose of this definition, “state” includes the District 
of Columbia. I.R.C. § 7701(10). 
 5. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between 
Developed and Developing Countries art. 4(3), 2011, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_ 
Model_2011_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL6M-49T5]; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 
[OECD], Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 4(3), Jan 28. 
2003, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf [https://perma.cc/W97Q-9VCZ]; De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe [1905] 2 KB 612, 631 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that a 
corporation whose CMC is in the U.K. is a U.K. resident); Luca Cerioni, The “Place of Effective 
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follow suit; others have proposed alternative tests, among them the corporation’s 
customer base, its source of income, the stock exchange on which the 
corporation’s shares are traded, or the country of residence of its shareholders.6 
Although the literature has extensively discussed the issue of corporate 
residence, it has paid little attention to the terms of reference of the debate. A 
typical argument will take the following form: the law should adopt Definition 
D as appropriate because it closely conforms to Principle P. However, such an 
argument is unpersuasive unless it also provides a convincing explanation for 
why P is the appropriate principle. Without such an explanation, the fact that D 
closely conforms to P is a brute fact with no normative value. Nonetheless, the 
literature generally ignores this first, crucial step. In most cases, it examines tests 
of corporate residence without a cogent justification for the principles by which 
it evaluates those tests. 
This Article will attempt to move the discourse to a more theoretical level 
by focusing attention not on the definitions themselves but rather on the criteria 
upon which commentators rely, either explicitly or implicitly, when considering 
the merits of particular definitions of corporate residence. In this Article, the 
terms “test” and “criterion” will refer, respectively, to a proposed definition of 
corporate residence and to a principle used to evaluate definitions. 
A survey of the literature reveals four criteria for evaluating tests of 
corporate residence. Part I considers the three most commonly relied upon 
criteria: manipulability, clarity, and benefit. It argues that all three are bereft of 
relevant normative content. Consequently, the fact that a particular test conforms 
to one or more of these criteria does not constitute adequate grounds for its 
adoption. 
The fourth criterion, and the newest member of the pantheon, is 
purposiveness. As opposed to the more traditional criteria, purposiveness does 
have normative value: a demonstration that a proposed test conforms to this 
criterion would constitute a reasonable argument in support of that test. Part II 
describes this criterion and explores whether it is possible to formulate a test that 
conforms to it. The answer is that it does not appear possible to do so. 
The fact that no test appears capable of satisfying the demands of the only 
criterion with normative value suggests that the quest for an appropriate 
definition of corporate residence may be a futile endeavor. The Conclusion will 
 
Management” as a Connecting Factor for Companies’ Tax Residence Within the EU vs. the 
Freedom of Establishment: The Need for a Rethinking?, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1095, 1095–96 (2012); 
Ashrita Prasad Kotha, Place of Effective Management Test in the Income Tax Act, 1961: Is It the 
Right Way Forward?, 8 NUJS L. REV. 13, 14 (2015) (India) (showing that India uses place of 
effective management test); Cerioni, supra note 5, at 1096 n.6 (showing that France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom determine 
corporate residence by reference to effective management). 
 6. See infra Parts I and II. 
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summarize the findings and offer some speculation as to why an acceptable 
definition of corporate residence is so elusive. 
I.  CRITIQUING THE CRITERIA: MANIPULABILITY, CLARITY, AND BENEFIT 
“[I]f you don’t know where you are going . . . you might not get there.”7 
A. Manipulability 
The most frequently relied upon criterion for evaluating tests of corporate 
residence is manipulability.8 This is particularly true with regard to POI. Critics 
of this test argue that it effectively makes worldwide taxation elective.9 Perhaps 
the most dramatic example of POI manipulability, and the one that has caught 
the attention of both policy makers and the popular press, is the phenomenon of 
corporate inversion in which a domestic corporation essentially expatriates by 
the simple expedient of re-registering in a foreign jurisdiction.10 
 
 7. Nate Scott, The 50 Greatest Yogi Berra Quotes, USA TODAY SPORTS: FOR THE WIN 
(Sept. 23, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/09/the-50-greatest-yogi-berra-quotes 
[https://perma.cc/2T3H-3DKN] (quote is widely attributed to Yogi Berra). 
 8. See, e.g., infra note 9. 
 9. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Defending Worldwide 
Taxation with a Shareholder-Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1681, 
1686 (2016); Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in the 
Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719, 725–26 (2003); Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax 
Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1643, 1653 (2013); Michael J. McIntyre, Determining the 
Residence of Members of a Corporate Group, 51 CANANDIAN TAX J. 1567, 1571 (2003); Adam H. 
Rosenzweig, Source as a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 471, 495 (2015); Daniel 
Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 N.Y.U. TAX L. 
REV. 155, 172 (2007); John A. Swain, Same Questions, Different Answers: A Comparative Look 
at International and State and Local Taxation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 111, 117 (2008); Joseph A. Tootle, 
The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities,” 33 VA. TAX REV. 
353, 354 (2013); see Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity 
of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 377, 381–85, 413 (2011) (distinguishing 
between formal and substantive electivity); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax 
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1666 (2000) 
(acknowledging that country of incorporation is easily manipulated); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A 
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 499 (2009); Ilan Benshalom, 
The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase, 28 
VA. TAX REV. 165, 216–17 (2008) (explaining how U.S. MNEs can take advantage of offshore 
low-tax jurisdictions simply by reincorporating there). 
 10. DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 3 (2016), https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Z8-3GVG]; e.g., Steven H. Goldman, Corporate 
Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71, 72 (2008) (inversion by forming a new foreign 
subsidiary); Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 
261, 322 (2001) (explaining how corporations can expatriate by merging with foreign entities); 
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Others have countered that POI may not be as freely electable as often 
assumed and that tax considerations do not necessarily predominate in choosing 
where to incorporate. Registration in a foreign jurisdiction involves additional 
costs that a cash-strapped start-up may not be able to afford or that the 
extraordinarily small chance that it will eventually become a successful 
multinational company may not justify.11 Home bias, a widespread albeit not 
entirely rational phenomenon, can present a psychological barrier to registration 
abroad.12 Some have argued that corporations registered in the United States 
may find it easier to obtain financing from domestic lenders or to attract local 
investors.13 If empirically accurate, these considerations could lend credence to 
POI from the perspective of manipulability. Furthermore, under the 
manipulability standard, the fact that these impediments are of concern primarily 
in a corporation’s early stages of development could justify restrictions placed 
upon attempts to expatriate via inversion during a later stage when obstacles to 
foreign registration no longer pose an insurmountable barrier. 
Moving to other tests of corporate residence, there are those who claim that 
CMC, which views a corporation as a resident of the country in which corporate 
policy is decided, is less manipulable than and consequently preferable to POI, 
as CMC requires the movement of persons rather than just pieces of paper.14 
Others argue that CMC is also problematic because the board of directors 
ultimately decides corporate policy, and it is relatively simple to arrange for 
boards to convene—when they need to convene at all—in the conference room 
 
Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1686–87 (inversion by combining with a foreign corporation); 
Marian, supra note 9, at 1654–55 (explaining how a U.S. corporation can invert by creating a 
foreign-incorporated shell entity and being “bought” by the foreign entity). 
 11. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 70–71 (2014); Susan C. 
Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319, 321 
(2013) (explaining how a U.S. incorporation “requires fewer monetary and other startup company 
resources”); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Designing a 21st Century 
Corporate Tax—An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures to Protect 
the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 718 (2015); Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 9, at 405. 
 12. SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 66; Shay et al., supra note 11, at 717–18. 
 13. SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 73; Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 9, at 408. 
 14. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beyond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise of ‘Managed and 
Controlled,’ 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 667, 668 (2011); Henry Ordower, Utopian Visions Toward a 
Grand Unified Global Income Tax, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 361, 404–05 (2013); Kyrie E. Thorpe, 
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Is the Internet Age Rendering the Concept of 
Permanent Establishment Obsolete?, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 633, 693 (1997); Terrence R. 
Chorvat, A Different Perspective on Tax Competition, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 501, 515 
(2003) (book review); see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate and International Tax Reform: 
Proposals for the Second Obama Administration (and Beyond), 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2013) 
(suggesting a “managed and controlled” definition of U.S. corporate residence to combat 
inversion). 
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of an offshore island resort.15 Consequently, some commentators prefer home 
office to CMC, on the theory that persuading directors to travel to an offshore 
island resort for an occasional extended weekend may present few difficulties, 
but that requiring high-ranking executives to move to such a location will meet 
stiffer resistance.16 Others counter that Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are not 
the only countries in the world that offer lenient corporate tax regimes. Taking 
up residence in Monaco, Switzerland, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, or the 
Netherlands may not be overly distasteful for senior executives of multinational 
corporations.17 Moreover, countries such as these are often home to individuals 
with the requisite managerial talent, so that multinationals could establish home 
offices in these countries and hire local management if the tax stakes were 
sufficiently significant. One commentator has suggested countering attempts at 
inversion by defining corporate residence in terms of the corporation’s consumer 
base on the theory that a customer base is less manipulable than POI.18 
Clearly, manipulability is a relevant consideration when formulating a tax 
regime. The drafters of tax rules do not have the luxury of operating in a world 
in which taxpayers go about their business without regard to the effect of their 
behavior on their tax liability. Tax provisions that, in the absence of avoidance-
induced behavior, would promote the stated goals of the tax system in a fair and 
efficient manner may be useless or even counterproductive in a world in which 
taxpayers are keenly aware of the tax consequences of their actions and often 
adjust that behavior with a view to reducing their tax liability. 
 
 15. Omri Marian, The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in Territorial Systems, 18 CHAP. 
L. REV. 157, 181 (2014). Furthermore, in today’s digital world convening at one physical location 
is no longer necessary. Oleksandr Pastukhov, International Taxation of Income Derived from 
Electronic Commerce: Current Problems and Possible Solutions, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 310, 
330 (2006); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting 
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 169, 187–88 (2008); Avi-Yonah, 
Globalization, supra note 9, at 1596; Thorpe, supra note 14, at 693–94. 
 16. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: 
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 135 (2005); David R. Tillinghast, A Matter of 
Definition: “Foreign” and “Domestic” Taxpayers, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 239, 262 (1984) 
(“[I]n recent years, the English Inland Revenue, apparently of the view that the ‘central 
management and control’ test is too maleable, has sought a legislative definition of corporate 
residence based on the presence in England of a company’s ‘principal office’.”); Avi-Yonah, 
Beyond Territoriality, supra note 14, at 668; Marian, supra note 9, at 1645. 
 17. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 N.Y.U. TAX 
L. REV. 507, 528 (1997); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And yet It Moves: Taxation and Labor Mobility in 
the Twenty-First Century, 67 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 169, 173 (2014); Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 
1710–11 (“[T]here is an adequate number of tax-advantaged foreign locations where U.S. managers 
can be stationed without their having to learn another language or sacrifice lifestyle comforts (e.g., 
Dublin, London, or Singapore).”); Marian, supra note 9, at 1646. 
 18. George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 
144 TAX NOTES 1087, 1087 (2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/yin-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EEX6-V9GY]. 
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However, manipulability is purely a negative standard. In other words, while 
it may be reasonable to reject a test that is easily manipulable, non-
manipulability does not constitute grounds for its adoption. By analogy, consider 
a tax based on height or eye color. The fact that it is not easy to manipulate these 
attributes does not mean that they are desirable tax bases.19 
Moreover, even in its negative manifestation, manipulability is weak in that 
it is a technical and not a substantive criterion. A call to reject a test because it 
is easily manipulable is less persuasive than a demonstration that the test has no 
normative justification. Again, by way of analogy, consider a tax based upon the 
month in which a person is born. One argument against such a tax is that 
prospective parents can try to arrange for their children to be born in “tax 
friendly” months. Another is that there is no correlation between the month in 
which a person is born and the goals of a rational tax structure. I submit that the 
latter objection is more persuasive than the former. 
The first issue that commentators need to address when discussing tests of 
corporate residence is the normative justification for imposing tax on the 
worldwide income of a corporation classified as domestic under the terms of 
each test. Why should a corporation registered in the United States be subject to 
U.S. tax on its worldwide income? Why should a corporation managed and 
controlled in the United States be subject to U.S. tax on its worldwide income? 
Why should a corporation whose primary customer base is in the United States 
be subject to U.S. tax on its foreign-source income? Analysis that focuses on 
manipulability as the sole or primary criterion by which to select a test for 
corporate residence has little persuasive force. 
B. Clarity 
Commentators often argue that, whatever its flaws, POI is preferable to 
other tests because it is clear and predicable. Its clarity saves precious resources 
that would otherwise have to be devoted to determining and perhaps litigating 
the question of whether the corporation is domestic or foreign. Its predictability 
reduces the degree of uncertainty regarding tax consequences that corporations 
and their shareholders face when making economic decisions.20 
In many cases, clarity is the mirror image of manipulability: the clearer the 
definition of corporate residence, the closer corporate residence may come to 
 
 19. For a discussion of height as a tax base, see David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle 
of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 60–62 (2006). 
 20. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 95 TAX 
NOTES 1793, 1797 (2002); Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate 
Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational 
Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 568 (2005) (discussing various benefits determined by the 
laws of the place of incorporation); Roin, supra note 15, at 189 (2008) (amending the place of 
incorporation definition of corporate residence will lead to ambiguity); Rosenzweig, supra note 9, 
at 489; Tillinghast, supra note 16, at 259–60. 
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being either formally or substantively elective.21 For example, under a check-
the-box regime in which corporations choose their status as domestic or foreign, 
the status of the corporation would be clear and formally elective.22 Under POI, 
residence status is clear and substantively elective. The control and management 
tests are both less clear and less elective: corporations may try to keep 
management and control outside the country, but they cannot be certain that the 
attempt will succeed. 
Yet clarity shares with manipulability the attribute of being technical and 
negative rather than substantive and positive, and the critique of manipulability 
applies here as well: the fact that a test is clear does not justify its adoption. 
Granted, when considering competing definitions, each of which is substantively 
justifiable, one might reasonably prefer the definition that is clearer just as one 
might in such a case reasonably prefer the definition that is less manipulable. 
However, without such normative content, clarity is not a reason to choose a 
particular definition of corporate residence. 
C. Benefit 
A third criterion often relied upon for evaluating tests of corporate residence 
is benefit. The idea is that if a particular nexus to a country provides a 
corporation with sufficient benefits, then that nexus is an appropriate test of 
residence.23 A corollary of this line of reasoning is the theory of the self-inflicted 
wound: knowing that availing themselves of a particular nexus will subject them 
to tax on their worldwide income, corporations that do so indicate by their 
behavior that the benefits are worth the cost and hence have no cause to 
complain.24 
Ostensibly, benefit correlates closely to manipulability. If the benefits 
inuring to a certain relationship to a country are significant enough, then the non-
 
 21. See, e.g., Tillinghast, supra note 16, at 272. 
 22. A check-the-box regime for corporate residence may indeed be the logical conclusion of 
any analysis that relies upon the criterion of clarity to evaluate definitions of corporate residence. 
See, e.g., Tillinghast, supra note 16, at 266. 
 23. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate 
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1201, 1205–06 (2004); Inho Andrew Mun, Reinterpreting Corporate 
Inversions: Non-Tax Competitions and Frictions, 126 YALE L.J. 2152, 2159 (2017) (suggesting 
that the solution to the problem of corporate inversions is to align tax paid with benefits); Kirsch, 
supra note 20, at 564–67; Marian, supra note 9, at 1615, 1642 (describing this view); see Rebecca 
S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
965, 1075 n.367 (1988–89). The benefits theory views “tax as a payment for the benefits of the 
corporate form of doing business.” Id. 
 24. Compare J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in 
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 315 (2001), with Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture: “What’s Source Got to Do with It?”: Source Rules and U.S. International 
Taxation, 56 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 81, 104–05 (2002). 
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tax cost of refraining from establishing such a connection or of severing such a 
connection once established will tend to decrease the degree of manipulability. 
For example, if there are nontax advantages to registration in the United States, 
then the risk of losing those advantages could serve as an impediment to 
registering abroad. 
Nevertheless, the focus of the two criteria is considerably different: whereas 
manipulability—like clarity—is wholly technical in nature, benefit purports to 
be a substantive criterion. Moreover, the fact that they will often lead to the same 
conclusion does not mean that they always will. For instance, consider the case 
of expatriation, via inversion if the test is POI, via moving control and 
management or home offices abroad if those are the determining tests of 
corporate residence, and so forth. Under the criterion of manipulability, the fact 
that expatriation is a relatively simple procedure and involves few negative 
nontax consequences is probably sufficient to warrant legislative 
countermeasures to prevent the corporation from shedding its residence. On the 
other hand, under the benefit criterion, the fact that the corporation does not 
value the advantages, if any, of retaining the relevant link may indicate that 
continuing to subject it to a regime of worldwide taxation is no longer 
normatively justifiable.25 
Working within the benefit criterion, some supporters of POI have argued 
that the advantages of U.S. registration are significant enough to justify the 
imposition of tax on worldwide income.26 The literature has explored a number 
of supposed benefits.27 Some commentators have pointed to the benefit inherent 
in existence itself and the fact that a corporation owes its income-earning 
capacity to the country that granted it legal life.28 However, this argument is 
weak primarily because the founders had free rein to incorporate their 
corporation anywhere they chose, so the benefit of incorporating in any 
particular jurisdiction is not the corporation’s legal life per se, but rather the 
relative advantages of incorporation in that jurisdiction as opposed to in another 
jurisdiction.29 Perhaps for this reason the literature tends to focus, not on the 
advantages of incorporation versus non-incorporation, but rather on the 
advantages of registration in the United States versus registration abroad. 
Discussing this issue, commentators have suggested the following advantages 
of U.S. incorporation: 
(1) As the laws of the jurisdiction in which a corporation is incorporated govern 
its internal affairs (i.e., the legal relations among shareholders and between 
 
 25. See, e.g., Marian, supra note 9, at 1643. 
 26. SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 194. 
 27. Marian, supra note 9, at 1642–43. 
 28. Kirsch, supra note 20, at 567; Tillinghast, supra note 16, at 259. 
 29. Kirsch, supra note 20, at 568. 
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shareholders and management), procuring the benefits of the typical U.S. 
corporate regime requires incorporation in the United States.30 
(2) Registration in the United States provides access to benefits under certain 
trade agreements to which the United States is a party.31 
(3) Only corporations registered in the United States are eligible to apply for 
certain government contracts.32 
(4) American consumers may prefer purchasing from what they view as an 
American corporation.33 
(5) U.S. legislators, administrators, and diplomats might be more willing to 
protect the interests of a corporation registered in the United States.34 
The benefit criterion can also furnish objections to these arguments.35 
Foreign jurisdictions have corporate law regimes that are similar to what is 
available in the United States.36 In the United States, corporate law is not 
federal—but state, so the advantages, if any, of domestic corporate law regimes 
could perhaps justify the imposition of state tax, but not federal tax.37 Relatively 
few corporations are interested in government contracts that require registration 
in the United States or in benefits under trade agreements; moreover, registration 
abroad is not necessarily a bar to obtaining government contracts ostensibly 
limited to U.S.-registered corporations or to benefits under trade agreements.38 
Consumer identification of a corporation as American or foreign is not usually 
a function of the jurisdiction in which the corporation is registered.39 American 
politicians and officials will usually protect the interests of corporations that 
operate in the United States even if they are registered abroad.40 
Other proposed tests for corporate residence, such as CMC, home office,41 
the stock exchange on which the corporation’s securities are listed,42 the 
 
 30. Id. at 551–58. 
 31. Id. at 558–61. 
 32. Id. at 561–62; see also Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 9, at 406. 
 33. Kirsch, supra note 20, at 563; see also Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 9, at 
407–08. 
 34. Kirsch, supra note 20, at 563. 
 35. Marian, supra note 9, at 1658; Roin, supra note 15, at 186 (“[M]any countries have 
adopted legal regimes acceptable both to investors and corporate management.”). 
 36. Tillinghast, supra note 16, at 266. 
 37. Kirsch, supra note 20, at 569. 
 38. Id. at 510–11, 514. 
 39. Id. at 563, 573. 
 40. Id. at 563–64. 
 41. Marian, supra note 9, at 1619 (referring to the home office test as the “real seat” test). 
 42. John T. VanDenburgh, Closing International Loopholes: Changing the Corporate Tax 
Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 313, 347–49 (2012) (proposing to 
tax corporations based “on revenue reported to a U.S. public stock exchange”); Marian, supra note 
9, at 1648–49 (discussing this view); Rudnick, supra note 23, at 1099. 
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corporation’s principal customer base,43 and its primary source of income,44 
have similarly been justified by reference to the benefit criterion. For example, 
when a corporation is registered in one country but maintains its home office in 
another, the argument can be made that the corporation procures more benefits 
from the latter—in the form of infrastructure, prestige, access to managerial 
talent, proximity to suppliers and customers, and so forth—than it does from the 
former. If this argument is accurate, then under the benefit criterion, the location 
of the corporation’s home office would be a better test for determining corporate 
residence than would the place of registration. 
Benefit seems to be a more appropriate criterion than does manipulability or 
clarity because it relies on a substantive connection between the corporation and 
the country that is claiming the right to tax its income. However, there are two 
problems with adopting benefit as a criterion for choosing tests of corporate 
residence. The first problem is practical. Measures undertaken by the 
corporation to avoid a benefit-based definition of residence may be detrimental 
to the taxing jurisdiction’s economic interests. For example, commentators have 
expressed concern that if the location of a corporation’s home office determines 
its residence for tax purposes, corporations will refrain from establishing their 
home offices in the United States, with a subsequent loss of high-paying 
managerial jobs.45 Defining residence by reference to the exchange on which a 
corporation’s securities are traded would make American exchanges less 
attractive as capital-raising venues.46 Professors Fleming, Peroni, and Shay have 
argued that tests relying on the location of the corporation’s consumer base or 
the geographical source of its income could induce adverse behavioral effects.47 
Perhaps paradoxically, the fact that registration in the United States represents a 
much lower degree of involvement in the U.S. economy may make POI, from 
this perspective, a more attractive test for corporate residence. Aside for the 
direct tax consequences, the United States has relatively little to lose by creating 
an incentive for corporations to incorporate elsewhere.48 
 
 43. Yin, supra note 18, at 1087. 
 44. Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 507. 
 45. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & ARIEL ASSA, U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 116 
(2007); Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1710–11; Marian, supra note 9, at 1620–22, 1657 
(describing this argument); Yin, supra note 18, at 1087. 
 46. Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1706–07 (suggesting this approach “might create a bias 
against listing companies in the United States” because a foreign corporation will be a U.S. tax 
resident “if any class of its shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital markets or 
is marketed to U.S. persons”); Marian, supra note 9, at 1647. 
 47. Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1710–11. 
 48. Michael J. Graetz, Can a 20th Century Business Income Tax Regime Serve a 21st Century 
Economy?, 30 AUSTRALIAN TAX F. 551, 566 (2015); Paul Krugman, Tax Avoidance du Jour: 
Inversion, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/opinion/paul-
krugman-tax-avoidance-du-jour-inversion.html [https://perma.cc/57K3-P9HZ] (“The most 
important thing to understand about inversion is that it does not in any meaningful sense involve 
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The second problem is normative. Although benefit theory once dominated 
the tax policy discourse,49 tax theory has long since abandoned benefit as a 
viable justification for the imposition of income tax. As scholars of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century demonstrated, there is no reason to 
believe that the benefit derived from government services bears a positive 
correlation to income.50 John Stuart Mill argued that the opposite might be the 
case: the wealthier one is, the less one may need to rely on government 
services.51 Consequently, in contemporary tax jurisprudence, the primary 
justification for income tax is ability-to-pay,52 reflecting the idea that the better 
off one is economically the more one should contribute to the provision of public 
goods and to redistributive efforts. As I have argued elsewhere, benefit and 
ability-to-pay represent different, perhaps incompatible, conceptions of justice. 
By requiring individuals and firms to pay in full for the services they receive 
from the state, benefit taxation prevents the government from disturbing the 
market distribution. In contrast, ability-to-pay taxation redistributes wealth.53 
 
American business “moving overseas.” . . . It [is] a purely paper transaction . . .”); Marian, supra 
note 9, at 1622. A jurisdiction with a POI test will not lose “the benefit of positive externalities 
such as direct investment, jobs, and so on.” Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors 
Bivens, Einavai, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, at 18, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 
(1923) [hereinafter 1923 Report]; JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 160 (New York, Hafner Publishing Co. 1948) (1789); THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 238 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651); ADAM SMITH, 2 AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 310–11 (London, A. 
Strahan, T. Cadell & W. Davies 9th ed. 1799) (1776). 
 50. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 156–57 (New York, D. 
Appleton & Co. 1884) (1848) [hereinafter MILL, PRINCIPLES]; JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 54–55 (London, J.M. Dent & Sons 
Ltd. 1972) (1863); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF 
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 3–4 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1938). 
 51. MILL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 50, at 156–57 (suggesting the “less robust members of the 
community” need more in the distribution of government sources). 
 52. See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 765 
(1995); Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091 (2001); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate 
Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1708−17 (2005) (viewing taxes as 
payments for benefits received from the government and explaining how these benefits increase 
progressively as wealth and income increase); Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing 
the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 112–13 (2011); 1923 Report, 
supra note 49, at 18; Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity, supra note 9, at 388−89; Fleming et al., 
Fairness in International Taxation, supra note 24, at 306. 
 53. David Elkins, The Case Against Income Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, 36 VA. 
TAX REV. 143, 175–76 (2017) (“[B]enefit theory is analytically the very antithesis of ability-to-
pay. Ability-to-pay attempts to redistribute wealth by imposing the greatest tax burden on those 
who are the best off economically. Benefit taxation, on the other hand, endeavors to preserve the 
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This is not to say that a state cannot logically employ both benefit taxation and 
ability-to-pay taxation. Each has its proper place.54 What it means is an attempt 
to justify an ability-to-pay tax (such as the income tax) in terms of benefit will 
necessarily fail.55 
The distinction between benefit and ability-to-pay has an important 
ramification in the international arena. Ability-to-pay requires the imposition of 
tax on foreign-source income: if we assume that accession to wealth is an 
appropriate measure of ability-to-pay, then ability-to-pay is a function, not of 
domestic income, but of worldwide income.56 In contrast, benefit theory would 
seem to lead to a territorial tax.57 For these reasons, commentators universally 
rely on ability-to-pay, not benefit, as the normative justification for taxing the 
worldwide income of resident individuals.58 
If benefit is incapable of justifying the imposition of tax on foreign-source 
income, then reliance on benefit to categorize a person as a resident, and 
therefore subject to tax on foreign-source income, is untenable. In other words, 
benefit theory cannot reasonably serve as a criterion by which to classify 
corporations as domestic or foreign.59 
 
status quo ante, by requiring those who benefit from government services to pay market value for 
them.”). 
 54. David Elkins, Taxation and the Terms of Justice, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 77 (2009). 
 55. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the 
Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221, 233–34 
(1995). The premise “those who are better able to pay must have received more benefit from the 
government” is “fallacious.” Id. 
 56. Elkins, supra note 53, at 168. 
 57. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 477–78. 
 58. William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming the 
Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 187–88 (2002); Jeffrey M. Colón, Changing U.S. 
Tax Jurisdiction: Expatriates, Immigrants, and the Need for a Coherent Tax Policy, 34 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1, 9 (1997); Eva Farkas-DiNardo, Is the Nation of Immigrants Punishing Its Emigrants: A 
Critical Review of the Expatriation Rules Revised by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 7 
FLA. TAX REV. 5, 11–12 (2005); Chang Hee Lee, Taxation of U.S.-Korea Technology Transfer: A 
Developing Country’s Point of View, 10 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (1992); Timothy Hisao 
Shapiro, Tax First, Ask Questions Later: Problems Predicting the Effect of President Obama’s 
International Tax Reforms, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 141, 167 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1323 (2011); Fleming et al., supra note 24, at 306. 
 59. Furthermore, under benefit theory it is difficult to justify restrictions on corporate 
expatriation. Benefit theory does not permit the imposition of a tax burden that is greater than the 
benefit taxpayers derive from government services. When a corporation expatriates it indicates that 
the cost of maintaining the relationship that underlies the definition of corporate residence is greater 
than the benefit of doing so. See, e.g., Marian, supra note 9, at 1630. 
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II.  PURPOSIVENESS 
A more promising line of reasoning in recent literature favors what we might 
describe as a purposive criterion for evaluating corporate residence.60 The idea 
behind purposiveness is that the corporate income tax is a means of achieving 
certain policy goals. Tax law should therefore adopt whichever definition of 
corporate residence best furthers those goals.61 
Of course, applying the purposive criterion requires one to identify the goal 
of the corporate income tax and to determine which definition of corporate 
residence most effectively furthers that goal. Reasonable minds may differ with 
regard to each of these issues.62 Nevertheless, the fact that there may be 
disagreement regarding how to apply this criterion does not necessarily 
undermine its validity. As with manipulability, clarity, and benefit, 
purposiveness does not dictate the appropriate test of residence but rather 
establishes the frame of reference for the discourse.  
Professor Marian has examined several possible goals of corporate income 
taxation and has suggested a residence rule that would follow from each one.63 
For example, several scholars have argued that the purpose of the corporate 
income tax is to rein in the power of corporations and to signal that ultimately 
the government is more powerful than corporate management.64 Marian 
 
 60. See id. at 1635 (explaining that the corporate tax residence debate is “largely disengaged 
from the purposes for which jurisdictions tax corporations”); see also McIntyre, supra note 9, at 
1570. One route a country can use to define corporate residence is “in terms of the function that 
residence taxation is intended to serve in a corporate income tax.” Id. 
 61. Marian, supra note 9, at 1617. 
 62. The two issues are independent of each other. Commentators can disagree regarding the 
goals of the corporate income tax while agreeing which definition best furthers each goal. 
Conversely, commentators can agree on the goal of corporate taxation but disagree with regard to 
the definition of corporate residence that best furthers that goal. Professor Marian argued that the 
corporate income tax may have multiple goals, a position that would further complicate the 
implementation of the purposive criterion. Id. at 1637. 
 63. With regard to past justifications for the corporate income tax, he argues that at the state 
level, the corporate income tax originally served as a fee for the privilege of incorporation at a time 
when incorporation required a specific charter and the legal personhood of a corporation ceased at 
the state’s border, and that at the federal level, the original purpose of the corporate income tax was 
to tax the richest Americans, whose wealth was largely in the form of stock in corporations 
registered in the United States and operating in the United States. He suggests that while the POI 
may have been reasonable under those circumstances, it no longer makes sense in today’s 
globalized world. Marian, supra note 15, at 168–75. 
 64. Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: A Persistent Policy Challenge, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 75, 78–79 (2011) (recognizing that the first corporate income tax was in part intended to 
prevent the abuse of power of corporations); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 61–62 (1990); Ajay K. Mehrotra, The 
Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative 
Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 510 (2010); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1244; 
Marian, supra note 15, at 166 (describing this view). 
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postulates that if this view is correct, then the appropriate test for corporate 
residence would be control and management.65 He indicates that an alternative 
purpose for corporate taxation is to neutralize certain agency costs and suggests 
that if this purpose is taken as controlling, then a corporation should be resident 
in the place where its securities are listed.66 Combining these two goals, Marian 
proposes classifying a corporation as domestic if either (a) it is managed and 
controlled in the United States, or (b) its securities are listed on a U.S. 
exchange.67 
Today, most scholars believe that the corporate income tax is best 
characterized as an administratively convenient indirect tax on shareholders.68 
In accordance with this perspective, some commentators have argued that 
corporate residence should follow shareholders’ residence.69 For example, in a 
recent article, Professors Fleming, Peroni, and Shay proposed a rule whereby a 
corporation would be a U.S. resident if U.S. individuals ultimately own 50% or 
 
 65. Marian, supra note 9, at 1644. If a CMC test is adopted, “then corporate tax works to 
counterbalance the managers’ excessive accumulation of power.” Id. Even if we accept the 
argument that the purpose of the corporate income tax is to regulate corporate management, it is 
not clear that the control and management test would necessarily follow. For example, consider 
two corporations: one with extensive business interests in China but controlled and managed in the 
United States, the other with extensive business interests in the United States but controlled and 
managed in China. It would seem that power of the latter is of greater concern to the United States 
government than is the former. 
 66. Marian, supra note 9, at 1647. 
 67. Id. at 1664. 
 68. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001); William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The 
Case for a Destination-Based, Cash Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 955, 996 
(2012) (“[There is a] widespread belief that taxing corporations offers a convenient and practical 
way of indirectly taxing corporate shareholders.”); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless 
Income, 65 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 99, 159 (2011); Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1700; Graetz, supra 
note 10, at 302–03; see Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate 
Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 1, 15–18 (2004) (discussing the 1913 corporate income tax); David M. 
Schizer, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or Shareholders (or Both), 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (2016). It is important to distinguish here between the nature of a tax 
as direct or indirect and the incidence of the tax. The corporate income tax is an indirect tax on 
shareholders because its immediate effect is to reduce the after-tax profit available for distribution 
to shareholders. With regard to the incidence of the tax, the corporate income tax may affect the 
supply and demand curves for goods, services, and capital, and if so then individuals other than 
shareholders may bear the ultimate economic burden. However, this is true also with regard to a 
tax imposed directly on shareholders, as it is with regard to a tax imposed directly on wage earners 
and so forth. See generally DAVID ELKINS, BEHIND THE SCENES OF CORPORATE TAXATION 10–12 
(2013). 
 69. Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational 
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 70–72 (1993); Kleinbard, supra note 68, at 160 (treating U.S. 
firms as U.S. persons if overwhelmingly owned by U.S. persons). 
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more of its shares, by vote or value, on the last day of the year.70 They then 
propose an irrefutable presumption of U.S. residence for any corporation 
incorporated in the United States and a rebuttable presumption of U.S. residence 
for any corporation whose shares are traded on a U.S. security exchange.71 
I agree that, as a criterion to evaluate tests of corporate residence, 
purposiveness is more persuasive than manipulability, clarity, or benefit. 
Moreover, I agree that whatever the original goal of corporate income taxation, 
the only purpose of the corporate income tax today is to serve as an indirect tax 
on shareholders.72 Together, these two propositions do seem to suggest a 
definition of corporate residence that relies on the residence of shareholders 
instead of on any attribute of the corporation itself. Nevertheless, classifying a 
corporation as a U.S. resident when the percentage of shares held by U.S. 
residents passes a certain threshold would be problematic, both practically and 
normatively. 
One practical issue is that applying such a definition requires information 
regarding the identity and residence of each of a corporation’s shareholders, and 
corporations may not have access to that information.73 Even when the 
corporation knows the identity of each of its shareholders, it may not necessarily 
know the shareholder’s residence, as defined in relevant tax legislation. For 
instance, the primary test for tax residence under U.S. law is the number of days 
an individual spent in the United States during each year of the three-year period 
culminating in the year in question.74 It is hardly reasonable to expect a 
corporation to investigate how many days each of its ultimate individual 
shareholders spent in the United States during the current and during the two 
previous years in order to determine whether the shareholder is a U.S. resident 
during the current year. To complicate matters further, the status of an individual 
as resident or nonresident can change not only from one year to the next, but 
also during the course of a single year.75 Furthermore, an individual may be a 
 
 70. Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1693, 1703. To counter possible attempts at manipulating 
year-end ownership they propose as an alternative that a corporation would be a U.S. resident if on 
the days ending each of the four quarters of a year, U.S. individuals own an average of 50% or 
more of the shares. Id. at 1703. 
 71. Id. at 1706, 1708. 
 72. For example, when shareholders pay tax on their proportionate shares of the corporation’s 
earnings (as in the case of an S Corporation), the corporation itself is not subject to tax. I.R.C. § 
1363(a) (2012). Were the function of the corporate income tax other than to serve as an indirect tax 
on shareholders, the direct payment of tax by shareholders would not obviate the need for an 
additional corporate-level tax. Conversely, where a non-corporate entity’s owners do not pay tax 
directly on their proportional shares of the entity’s earnings (e.g., an LLC that elected to “check the 
box”), the entity itself will be subject to tax. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3(a) (2016). 
 73. For example, shares may be held in a blind trust or by corporations or other entities that 
are not required to divulge the identity of their shareholders. 
 74. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(3) (2012). 
 75. § 7701(b)(2). 
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resident of more than one country under their domestic tax laws. In such a case, 
tax treaties provide a list of criteria by which to determine residence, a list 
typically including such amorphous terms as “personal and economic relations,” 
“permanent home,” and “habitual abode.”76 Even if a corporation determines 
that its shareholder is a U.S. resident under U.S. domestic law, it would need to 
know whether that individual is the resident of another country under its 
domestic tax law, and, if so, with which country the shareholder’s personal and 
economic relations are closer, where the shareholder habitually resides, and so 
forth. It is unreasonable to expect a corporation to have access to the information 
required to make such a determination. Moreover, the amorphous terms of 
reference mean that even if the corporation has access to all of the relevant facts 
it may be difficult to arrive at the appropriate legal conclusions. 
Another practical issue is the expectation of avoidance measures. The 
significant tax consequences of the corporation crossing the threshold of U.S.-
resident shareholding would in practice force taxpayers to plan their investment 
strategies accordingly (and tax advisors who did not caution their clients about 
the cost of crossing the threshold and did not suggest means of avoiding the 
consequences of doing so would most likely be derelict in their duty). For 
example, shareholders might adopt a structure that allows U.S. residents to 
exercise control over the corporation or to share in its earnings via contractual 
arrangements, such as options and other derivatives,77 royalties, or voting 
compacts, rather than via shareholding. Policing such tax avoidance would 
require the adoption of anti-abuse provisions, which would—if experience is any 
guide—simply encourage more sophisticated tax planning techniques to avoid 
the anti-abuse provisions on the one hand and serve as a trap for innocent and 
less-well-advised taxpayers on the other.78 Although, as noted, the non-
manipulability of a given test is not in itself an argument in favor of its adoption, 
the fact that a proposed test would require extensive anti-abuse measures might 
well constitute a good reason to reject it.79 Furthermore, if taxpayers are 
unwilling to engage in aggressive tax planning or if anti-abuse measures 
successfully render such techniques ineffective, then a threshold determination 
of corporate residence could serve as a disincentive for foreign residents to enter 
into joint projects with U.S. residents. 
However, more important in my opinion than the practical problems 
inherent in applying a threshold test is the normative issue. Recall that 
 
 76. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention art. 4(3), 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/re 
source-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MM6K-USJQ]. 
 77. Fleming et al., supra note 9, at 1706 (acknowledging the problem of derivatives). 
 78. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 497–98 (describing the over-inclusiveness of § 
7874 anti-inversion rules, avoidance of the anti-inversion rules, and proposals to strengthen the 
anti-inversion rules in response to the avoidance techniques). 
 79. See supra Section I.A. 
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underlying the proposal to define corporate residence in terms of shareholder 
residence is the proposition that the corporate income tax is an indirect tax on 
shareholders. When U.S. residents own either 0% or 100% of the shares in a 
corporation (and ignoring the possibility of shareholder-like rights via means 
other than shareholding), a rule making corporate residence a function of 
shareholder residence would indeed accord with the purpose of the corporate 
income tax. In such a case, U.S. shareholders would indirectly pay tax on their 
worldwide income and foreign shareholders would indirectly pay tax only on 
their U.S.-source income. However, with regard to any corporation with both 
U.S. and foreign shareholders, the proposed rule would effectively lead either to 
the imposition of tax on the foreign-source income of foreigners simply because 
their fellow shareholders were U.S. residents or to the non-imposition of tax on 
the foreign-source income of U.S. residents simply because their fellow 
shareholders were foreign residents. For example, under the proposed “50% or 
more” rule, U.S. shareholders collectively owning less than 50% of the shares 
would effectively escape current tax on their foreign source income, while 
foreign shareholders collectively owning 50% or less of the shares would 
effectively be subject to U.S. tax on their foreign source income. Neither of these 
results is consistent with the idea that the goal of corporate taxation is to impose 
an indirect tax on shareholders.80  
CONCLUSION 
The literature has hitherto failed to produce a satisfactory definition of 
corporate residence. The most commonly applied criteria are unpersuasive. 
Manipulability and clarity are technical standards with no normative content, 
and they are negative rather than positive standards that can on occasion provide 
convincing reasons to reject a proposed test but cannot provide convincing 
reasons to adopt one. Benefit, although it purports to be substantive, cannot serve 
as a criterion by which to evaluate tests of corporate residence. It has long been 
recognized that the normative justification for income taxation in general and 
for the taxation of foreign-source income in particular is not benefit but rather 
ability-to-pay. Relying upon benefit to justify a tax on foreign-source income is 
incongruous. 
Recently, the literature has explored the possibility of defining corporate 
residence by reference to the goals of corporate income taxation. This standard 
 
 80. As a point of comparison, note that when U.S. residents and foreign residents invest is a 
joint project via a partnership or an LLC, the anomaly just described does not occur. The U.S. 
partners or members are subject to tax on their share of the entity’s income on a worldwide basis. 
The foreign partners or members are subject to tax on their share of the entity’s U.S.-source income, 
but not on their share of the entity’s foreign-source income. From a policy perspective, it is difficult 
to justify a radically different result just because the vehicle through which they chose to channel 
their investment is a corporation. 
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is more convincing than manipulability, clarity, or benefit. The problem with 
purposiveness is not in its substance but in its application. The corporate income 
tax serves as an indirect tax on shareholders. To conform to the purposive 
criterion, a definition of corporate residence would therefore need to result in 
the imposition of tax on the worldwide income of resident shareholders and on 
the domestic-source income of nonresident shareholders. It is difficult to 
conceive of a test of corporate residence that could accomplish that feat, and, 
indeed, the literature has so far failed to produce one.  
The fact that the literature has heretofore been incapable of providing a test 
of corporate residence that conforms to a reasonable criterion suggests that there 
exists no such test. Admittedly, a proof that relies on the absence of conflicting 
evidence is less than fully convincing. The fact that only one of the criteria 
discussed in the literature passes muster does not disprove the possibility that 
another, hitherto undiscovered criterion could reasonably serve as the basis for 
evaluating tests of corporate residence. Nor does the fact that of the myriad 
proposed tests of corporate residence, none satisfy the demands of the purposive 
criterion or disprove the possibility that such a test exists. However, neither of 
these possibilities seems likely. 
The question that remains is why an acceptable definition of corporate 
residence remains so elusive. Perhaps the underlying problem is the very notion 
of corporation residence. A deeper analysis might reveal that the concept of 
corporate residence involves an internal contradiction and that the continuing 
failure to develop a successful definition of corporate residence is simply a 
manifestation of that theoretical impossibility. Space limitations prevent 




 81. The article has since been published as David Elkins, The Myth of Corporate Tax 
Residence, 9 COLUM. J. TAX L. 5 (2017). 
